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PUTTING THE DORMANCY DOCTRINE
OUT OF ITS MISERY
Richard D. Friedman*
Justice Antonin Scalia has put on the academic table the question
of whether the doctrine of the dormant commerce clause should be
abandoned. That is a significant contribution, for this is an issue that
should be debated thoroughly. But Justice Scalia's campaign against
the doctrine has been notably ambivalent. On the one hand, he argues
that the doctrine lacks justification in constitutional text, history, and
theory.1 On the other hand, assertedly feeling the pressure of stare
decisis,2 he has gone along with, and even
led, applications of the doc3
trine, although within narrow limits.

In this essay, I argue that Justice Scalia's instincts are correct:
the dormancy doctrine ought to be abandoned, though not necessarily
for the reasons he suggests. The doctrine is the result of an historical
anomaly. It has long outlived its usefulness, and stare decisis is an
insufficient prop to keep it standing. I believe the doctrine requires
the courts to make political and economic judgments that could be
made better--certainly more efficiently and legitimately, and perhaps
more wisely as well-by other branches of government. From the
comfort of the academic sidelines that Justice Scalia has left, I suggest
* My thanks to Charlie Bieneman and David Goodhard for very able research assistance
on this piece, and to David Katz, Larry Kramer, Mark Tushnet, and Elliot Weiss for helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
1 See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington, 483 U.S. 232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he Court for over a century has engaged in an enterprise that
it has been unable to justify by textual support or even coherent nontextual theory, that it was
almost certainly not intended to undertake, and that it has not undertaken very well.").
2 "It is astonishing that we should be expanding our own beachhead in this impoverished
territory, rather than being satisfied with what we have already acquired by a sort of intellectual adverse possession." Id. But cf.Burt, Precedent and Authority in Antonin Scalia's Jurisprudence, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1685, 1689 (1991) (in Scalia's view, "[ilf a judge has correctly
construed the document's original intent, this opinion is worth respect; if not, then not (unless
the judge's error has become too deeply entrenched in practice-repeated too often, relied
upon too extensively-to correct without substantial disruptions)."); Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699 (1991). Professor Strauss argues that it is
not necessarily a paradox that Scalia appears to be "deeply respectful of tradition" while not
"a great fan of stare decisis": "Precedent overlaps tradition; it is not subsumed by it. Some
precedents may be said to be part of a tradition. But not all are." Id. at 1705, 1699, 1706.
3 See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2491, 2503-04 (1989) (concurring in part);
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 272 (1989) (concurring in judgment); Bendix Autolite Corp.
v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897-98 (1988) (concurring in judgment); New Energy Co.
v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988) (for a unanimous Court).
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that he, and the Court, go further than merely complaining about the
doctrine
of the dormant commerce clause; they should do away with
it. 4
To prevent any confusion, I will assert right off that I recognize
as essential to our national economy that there be some federal authority ready and able to invalidate state laws that unacceptably interfere with interstate commerce. Indeed, the need to prevent provincial
state legislation was one of the principal reasons for the creation of
our Constitution.' The need for a supervising authority is as necessary now as it was in 1787-and as it will increasingly be for the
European Community in the 1990s. My argument is simply that this
authority should not be judicial. I do not question whether the authority should exist; I only question who should exercise it. Congress
itself can perform only a small part of the job. Most of the burden,
therefore, must be borne by one or more administrative agencies. To
some extent, Congress and the administrative agencies already perform the oversight function, but with judicial review under the commerce clause as a backup. Removing this backup, thereby shifting the
function entirely to the political branches (with judicial review only to
prevent arbritary action violating due process), would not necessarily
result in the invalidation of fewer state laws. Any agency might well
perform the primary oversight function more aggressively than the
courts, because the agency would not confront the factors that appropriately inhibit the courts from unduly interfering with political
decisions.
Professor Tushnet suggests that Justice Scalia's "textual and historical attack on the doctrine [of the dormant commerce clause] is
substantially less powerful than he believes it to be." 6 I agree with
4 I thus go further than does Professor Eule, who argues that the dormancy doctine
should be eliminated except to the extent necessary to take up what he perceives as the slack
left by an unduly narrow view of the term "citizens" in the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV, section 2 of the Constitution. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest,
91 YALE L.J. 425, 428 (1982). Under one clause or the other, then, he would protect out-ofstate corporate interests against discriminatory state laws. By contrast, I would eliminate the
dormancy doctine altogether, without expanding the scope of the privileges and immunities
clause beyond a narrow prohibition-the bounds of which I will not attempt to define here--of
certain types of discrimination against individuals.
5 G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 99 (11th ed. 1985); see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 404-05 (2d ed. 1988).
6 Tushnet, Scalia and the Dormant Commerce Clause.: A Foolish Formalism?, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1991). It is important to note that where constitutional interpretation is concerned, Scalia has endorsed the doctrine of "originalism," which approves of the use
of the Constitution's "legislative history" when adjudging its meaning. See Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864-65 (1989). In contrast, as Nicholas Zeppos
points out, where statutory interpretation is concerned, "Scalia has urged an abandonment of
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this assertion, but, as I contend in Part I of this essay, the textual and
early historical arguments in favor of the doctrine are shaky at best.
These arguments are far from compelling, either in the sense that they
are completely persuasive or that they preclude current debate about
the appropriateness of the doctrine. In Part II, I set forth the reasons
of constitutional policy and theory why the doctrine ought to be
discarded.
I.

TEXT AND HISTORY

Neither text nor history resolves the question of whether the dormant commerce clause doctrine should persist. Even if the text or
early history of the commerce clause clearly indicated that the framers did not intend for the clause to have a dormant aspect, or at least
not one resembling the current doctrine, that would not be sufficient
evidence to discard the doctrine, if it made sense; the encrustation of
well over a century of precedent has given the doctrine the legitimacy
it needs and may have lacked when the clause was written. 7 Similarly, demonstrating that the doctrine reflects the framers' intent does
not suffice to uphold the doctrine if it is not sensible, unless the showing of intent is so compelling that a departure would amount to a
breach of faith.
The significance of text and history with respect to the current
appropriateness of the doctrine is not limited to questions of legitimacy. If the doctrine were engrained into our constitutional system
from the outset, this might suggest that it is integral to our notion of
federalism. To dispel this suggestion, those who advocate abandoning
the doctrine still need not carry the burden of proof regarding the
original understanding of the clause; it is enough if the framers of the
Constitution and others in the early years of the Constitution were
unclear as to whether the doctrine existed, or at least were not firmly
committed to it.8 In other words, the advocates of discarding the dormant commerce clause need not, and in fact cannot, score a knockout
the Court's traditional use of legislative history to interpret statutes." Zeppos, Justice Scalia's
Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1598 (1991); see also
id. at 1619-20.
7 Cf Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2116 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (declining to
reconsider the prevailing in-state service rule: "[F]or our purposes, its validation is its pedigree,
as the phrase 'traditionalnotions of fair play and substantial justice' makes clear." (emphasis in
original)). But see Strauss, supra note 2 (arguing that longevity of precedent is not sufficient
basis to justify its continuance); Burt, supra note 2 (same).
8 Ideally, though,, a theory in favor of discarding the doctrine should posit factors that
explain how it grew and thrived for so long, but that no longer justify it. In Part II, I offer
some speculations on this theory.
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blow on the textual and historical issues; a draw will suffice. But I
believe we can do better.
As Justice Scalia notes, the language of the commerce clause is
naturally read as merely a grant of power to Congress. If that is all
the clause was intended to do, the historical issue is at an end. In
Albert Abel's exhaustive study of the early history of the clause, one
can draw a glimmering of evidence from the Constitution's earliest
days supporting this restrained linguistic reading of the clause.9
The natural reading of the clause, however, is not the only plausible one. By implication, a grant of power can also be exclusive, as
some of the powers in article I, section 8 appear to be. Indeed, Abel
concludes that "[o]n the whole" the evidence provides stronger support for the view that the grant of power was understood to be exclusive within the limited field that was, at that time, deemed
commerce. 10

Abel does not express great confidence in this conclusion; he says
that the issue of the clause's effect on the states was neither "clearly
posed [nor] unequivocally settled."'I But even assuming his conclusion is correct-and I have no reason to suspect it is not-it provides
limited comfort for a supporter of the modem doctrine of the dormant commerce clause. Abel's conclusion does suggest that some
state laws would be invalid under the unexercised commerce power.
But his conclusion appears, at least at first glance, to do so on terms
that are unacceptable today. The original understanding as hypothesized by Abel leaves no room for valid state regulation of commerce.
And it is of course essential to our notion of federalism that the states
be able to regulate some aspects of commerce-at least of what today
we deem to be commerce.
Thus, one seeking to find support for the modern dormancy doctrine in the early constitutional history cannot be satisfied merely by
reading into the clause the qualification that the grant of power is
exclusive. The interpolation must be doubly complex: in some areas
the grant to Congress must be deemed exclusive, and in other areas
concurrent (and of course some areas, now perhaps vanishingly small,
are unreached by the grant at all). I am not willing to go as far as
Justice Scalia and say that such a multifaceted reading of unfaceted
language is illegitimate.' 2 In FederalistNo. 32, Hamilton argues rea9 See Abel, The Commerce Clause in the ConstitutionalConvention and in Contemporary
Comment, 25 MINN. L. REv. 432, 489-90 (1941).
10 Id. at 493-94; see id. at 491-93.
' 1 Id. at 481.
12 In his dissent in Tyler Pipe, Justice Scalia wrote that the doctrine that some regulations

of commerce require exclusive legislation by Congress and some do not "has the misfortune of
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sonably that some federal powers must be construed as exclusive, even
in the absence of explicit language, because a concurrent state power
would unacceptably obstruct the federal power.13 If this argument is
accepted, then it is plausible to argue further that the determination of
obstructiveness should be made case by case, application by application, rather than in gross, clause by clause. Indeed, this argument
seems to lead to something similar to the doctrine enunciated in Coo14
ley v. Board of Wardens.
Even if such a construction of the text is plausible, however, it is
certainly not compelled by the constitutional language. Nor could
one plausibly argue that this construction was generally accepted and
understood-much less articulated-by those who drafted, debated,
and ratified the Constitution. Nevertheless, those supporting modem
dormancy doctrine could maintain, with some force, that contemporaries of the Constitution did regard the clause as being disaggregated,
rather than as a monolithic whole. Abel persuasively demonstrates
that the framers regarded the clause as being an affirmative grant of
regulatory power with respect only to foreign commerce, which was
their primary concern. 5 The framers, as well as the ratifiers, paid
only "incidental and minor regard" to commerce between the states; 6
they believed that the power to regulate that commerce was to be
supervisory only, restraining state-created preferences and
discriminations." 7

A supporter of modem dormancy doctrine might argue that this
history reveals the requisite structure, designating one area of exclusive Congressional power as well as one of concurrent powers: the
heart of the clause's grant (covering foreign commerce) was exclusive,
if Abel's hedged conclusion is correct, while on a matter of peripheral
concern (interstate commerce), the power was concurrent, in that
Congress was authorized to nullify state legislation. Even if the precise boundaries between the exclusive and concurrent areas have
finding no conceivable basis in the text of the Commerce Clause, which treats 'Commerce...
among the several States' as a unitary subject." Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington, 483 U.S.
232, 265 (1987).
13 THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 80-83 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairfield ed. 1981), quoted in
Abel, supra note 9, at 489.
14 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) ("Whatever subjects of this power [to regulate commerce] are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation,
may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress."); see
also Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 279-80 (1873).
15 Abel, supra note 9, at 465, 469.
16 Id. at 465; see id. at 470-71, 472.
17 Id. at 469-72, 475.

HeinOnline -- 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1749 1990 - 1991

1750

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:1745

changed over two centuries, the argument runs, this does not negate
the structural point.
I do not believe this argument succeeds. For one thing, the area
of potentially exclusive federal power, as originally conceived, was
very narrow. It was not only limited to the international context, but
even within that context
three large classes of subjects-fiscal regulation as to imports and
exports, navigation, "mercantile" enterprises-are the only ones
that there is any evidence for believing were thought of by any one
as embraced within "commerce" or affected by the grant of power
to regulate it .... Peripheral matters-the routes and channels of
internal communication, internal police regulations determinative
of whether and on what conditions articles of commerce might
move between state and state, the establishment of a trustworthy
medium of exchange-might be ever so intimately connected with
commerce, but they were not commerce, and Congress had no
power over them under, or by implication from, the commerce
clause. 8
Thus, if the framers and others at the time of the Constitution regarded the exclusive nature of the commerce clause as not only tolerable, but hardly worthy of comment, it was probably because the grant
of active power to Congress, and the corresponding withdrawal of
power from the states, was so limited.
Furthermore, according to Abel, the area of exclusive federal
power was also the exclusive area of active federal power. Interstate
matters, the area of supposed concurrence, involved overlapping powers in one sense only; although the states and Congress could both
regulate aspects of what we would now consider interstate commerce,
Congress' legislation was limited to controlling unsuitable state laws.
Thus, the structure of the commerce clause according to Abel's
account of the original understanding simply does not square with the
present structure of the clause. Under the original structure, as
viewed by Abel, Congress was given a "mild, modest little power," 19
limited to active regulation of certain areas of foreign commerce and
the negation of some state regulations of interstate commerce. The
states could not act in the areas of active federal regulation at all. But
because the framers did not "think of the arteries of commerce, the
highways and the inland streams, harbors, bridges, and the like, as
within the ambit of congressional power under the commerce
clause," 2 the clause did not limit state power in these areas at all. In
18

Id. at 465, 481.

19 Id.
20

at 481.

Id. at 478.
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the current structure, by contrast, active federal power is far more
encompassing, but the mere fact that an area is within the scope of
that power does not mean that it is removed from the state's realm.
Today, we depend on the "fine large substitute" that the courts
have created to replace the original limited grant of active federal
power.2 In addition, we depend on there being a significant overlap
in the areas that the states and Congress, respectively, can regulate
actively; we cannot tolerate an expansive but exclusive federal power,
one that precludes state action absent federal action, any more than
we can be satisfied by severely limited federal power. Plainly, then,
we cannot--or at any rate will not-live today with the original conception of the commerce clause described by Abel. The judicially
crafted federal power of today suits our needs far better and is at least
a plausible reading of the text, if not the history, of the clause. A
fortiori,. even assuming contrary to its most natural reading that the
clause was understood to effect a partial exclusion of state power
(which is by no means certain), there is no need to view the clause
that way today if doing so obstructs our constitutional needs. And
there is certainly no need to expand such an exclusion beyond its original bounds.
This is not simply a matter of "sauce for the goose, sauce for the
gander." That is, I am not arguing (though the argument may have
some validity) that, if we can expand the federal power beyond recognition from its original shape, we might as well feel free also to disregard poorly articulated and uncertain limitations on state power. I
am arguing, however, that the structure of the commerce clause as
originally conceived provides no significant support for the vastly different structure of the clause as it stands today. If the original structure removed power from the states, it did so because the active grant
of power to Congress was exclusive; in 1787, there was nothing comparable to the current system, in which some areas that can be
reached by active federal regulation are also subject to state regulation
while others are not.
This argument does not suggest that the framers ignored the
problem of state laws obstructing the national economy. Their solution, though, was not to write into the Constitution an invalidation of
such obstructions; rather it was to authorize Congress to remove
them. That is the reason why the framers decided to give Congress
power over interstate commerce.
The history of state regulation in early post-Constitutional years
21

Id. at 480, 481.

HeinOnline -- 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1751 1990 - 1991

1752

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:1745

confirms that nothing close to the modem conception of the dormant
commerce clause was in the air. As Abel summarized this period,
The decades before Gibbons v. Ogden[221 were a time neither of legislative inaction nor of constitutional confusion .... There was
throughout a vigorous proliferation of action by the state governments--establishment of highways, of canals, of navigable watercourses, of telegraph systems and railroads, control of harbors and
coastal rivers, of vessels and vehicles, of conditions of the highway,
of equipment and weight loads of vehicle .... [These actions] peculiarly and in some cases expressly impinged on interstate
intercourse.23
Yet the question of whether such laws were valid under the commerce
clause was not presented to the Supreme Court before Gibbons because, "almost without exception, Marshall's contemporaries in the
infancy of the republic did not regard the questions involved as
presenting commerce clause issues." '24 On the few occasions when
lower courts were presented with the argument that the commerce
clause of its own force invalidated state laws regulating what we now
think of as interstate commerce, the courts rejected the argument almost out of hand.25
Chancellor Kent's opinion in one of those cases, Livingston v.
Van Ingen ,26 is particularly interesting. In that case, the New York
Court for the Correction of Errors sustained the same steamboat monopoly that was later invalidated in Gibbons. Because the case, unlike
Gibbons, involved carriage wholly in New York waters, it was easy for
Kent to say that the subject matter was beyond the scope of federal
power. But Kent went further, and rejected in principle a dormant
commerce clause argument:
The states are under no other restrictions than those expressly
specified in the constitution, and such regulations as the national
government may, by treaty, and by laws, from time to time, prescribe. Subject to these restrictions, I contend, that the states are
at liberty to make their own commercial regulations .... Whenever the case shall arise of an exercise of power by congress which
shall be directly repugnant and destructive to the use and enjoyment of the appellants' grant, it would fall under the cognizance of
the federal courts, and they would, of course, take care that the
laws of the union are duly supported .... But when there is no
22 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
23

Abel, Commerce Regulation Before Gibbons v. Ogden: Interstate TransportationFacili-

ties, 25 N.C.L. REV. 121, 170-71 (1947).
24 Id. at 171.
25 Id. at 167-70.
26 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812).
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existing regulation which interferes with the grant, nor any pretence of a constitutional interdict, it would be most extraordinary
for us to adjudge it void, on the mere contingency of a collision
with some future exercise of congressional power. Such a doctrine
is a monstrous heresy. 27

Kent's reliance on Congress squares with the anticipation of the
framers: Congress would remove obstructions to interstate commerce,
and the courts would get involved only by giving force, under the
supremacy clause, to the acts of Congress. But Congress, as Chief
Justice Marshall and other members of the Supreme Court no doubt
realized, was not up to the job. Thus, the courts began to take up the
slack. Because they were unfamiliar with the modem administrative
state, it probably never occurred to them that another alternative was
possible.

II.

THEORY AND POLICY

In this Part, I contend that, as a matter of constitutional theory
and policy, the power to decide which state laws impermissibly obstruct interstate commerce should not be exercised by the courts.
First, the determination of which laws impede interstate commerce is
an exercise of national political policy, and little more. 28 To say that
the matter is one of policy does not necessarily mean that the courts
should not get involved--courts make policy judgments all the timebut it does suggest that, in the absence of countervailing reasons, the
political branches are capable of making such a determination, and
legitimately should do so, without judicial involvement. Second, no
such countervailing considerations are presented here: there is no
need for the courts to perform this policy function, and over the long
run this function will be performed far better by the political
branches.
State laws are held invalid under the dormancy doctrine either
because they burden interstate commerce excessively or because they
discriminate improperly. 29 That the "excessive burden" branch of the
doctrine is merely a matter of national political policy is apparent on
its face. This part of the doctrine calls for a balancing of the "burden
imposed on [interstate] commerce" and the "putative local benefits." 3 0 If the state law accomplishes some local benefit-and it alId. at 578.
"Political policy" is used here in an all-encompassing sense to include economic and
social, as well as strictly political, policies.
29 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
30 Id.
27
28
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most always will-the outcome of the balance depends on what policy
values one attaches to the benefits and burdens. Do the benefits to
interstate commerce of permitting sixty-five-foot double trailers outweigh the inconvenience of riding alongside or behind such trailers?3"
That depends on how substantial those benefits are, what value we
place on them, and on how much of a nuisance we find it to have an
enormous truck for a neighbor on the highway.
It is therefore not surprising that, more than a half a century ago,
the Supreme Court declared that nondiscriminatory state laws should
not be invalidated simply because of the burdens they impose on interstate commerce.32 Since then, however, at least in its rhetoric, the
Court has ignored this earlier position.33
It is less readily apparent that the determination of whether a
state law impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce is a
matter of policy choice. But I believe this point can be demonstrated.
Let us put aside the frequently difficult questions of whether the law
does discriminate, either in purpose or effect, and even the broader
question of what we mean by discrimination. My point is that, even if
a law clearly discriminates, and this discrimination was clearly intentional, there may still be various reasons why, as a matter of national
policy, such a law should not be disturbed.
Undoubtedly, a state may promote its own commerce without
promoting that of its neighbors. If a state decides to enter the market
as a participant, it may decide with whom it will deal, as may a private market actor.34 These principles, I believe, are part of a broader
theory-that it may be sound national economic policy for the states
or their subdivisions to act in certain respects as commercial, competitive units.
A related principle appears to be at play here: at times, it may be
sound policy to avoid free rider problems and to say that the citizens
31 Cf Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (plurality opinion);
Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
32 This Court has often sustained the exercise of [a state's regulatory] power although
it has burdened or impeded interstate commerce ....
In each of [the cases cited]
regulation involves a burden on interstate commerce. But so long as the state
action does not discriminate, the burden is one which the Constitution permits
because it is an inseparable incident of the exercise of a legislative authority,
which, under the Constitution, has been left to the states.
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938).
33 In The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1174-82 (1986), my colleague Don Regan has argued
that in movement-of-goods cases the Court has, language notwithstanding, invalidated state
laws only for discriminatory purpose.
34 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 435-36, 440 (1980).
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of the state who pay the cost of an investment, perhaps in the form of
taxes, may reap the rewards. Such a policy may not Only be fairest to
the state's citizens, but it may also encourage the state to make the
investment in the first place. I believe this is the reason why states are
permitted to give tuition preferences to their own citizens.3" Perhaps
this argument could be extended to some cases in which the investment, although not closely related to the activity in question, significantly improves the economic infrastructure of the state.
Moreover, even if a state law appears to be purely protectionisteven if it simply favors the state's own citizens and is not based at all
on efforts to channel an investment by the state-there may be good
reason to allow it. Discrimination in favor of an infant industry, for
example, may be beneficial in the long run, and not only to citizens of
the legislating state.36
Obviously, discrimination carries detriments from the national
point of view that most often outweigh the local benefits. Thus, I do
not mean to suggest that in any particular case discriminatory laws
ought to prevail. Rather, I mean that discriminatory laws may have
valid policy considerations in their favor, and that in a particular case
a national policymaker might conclude that they should prevail. Furthermore, if the responsible national policymaker reaches such a conclusion, there is no superseding reason why the nation's constitutional
well-being requires any other result. Just as the antitrust laws, while
making free competition the general national economic policy, do not
mandate a rule of laissez-faire, the commerce clause, while reflecting a
general policy in favor of free trade, should not mandate free trade
constitutionally. The commerce clause does not enact Adam Smith's
Wealth of Nations any more than the fourteenth amendment enacts
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
The crucial question remains: if, as I have argued, a weighing of
35 See, e.g., Johns v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom. Twist v.
Redeker, 396 U.S. 853 (1969). In Johns, the Eighth Circuit noted:
A substantial portion of the funds needed to operate the Regents' schools are provided by legislative appropriation of funds raised by taxation of Iowa residents and
property. Nonresidents and their families generally make no similar contributions
to the support of the school. A reasonable additional tuition charge against non-

resident students which tends to make the tuition charged more nearly approximate the cost per pupil of the operation of the school does not constitute an
unreasonable and arbitrary classification violative of equal protection.
Id at 883.
36 In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1984), the Supreme Court

refused to recognize a doctrinal distinction between thriving and struggling industries. That
does not mean that there is no basis in policy for such a distinction. See Regan, supra note 33,
at 1140 ("the possibility of genuine infant industry cases and the like ... suggest[s] .
that
perhaps Congress ought to be able to authorize protectionist state laws").
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competing policy considerations determines whether a burdensome or
discriminatory state law should be invalidated, should the courts be
doing the weighing?
One reason for courts to enter a policy fray is that constitutional
values are at stake. But that is not so with respect to the dormant
commerce clause. In particular, commerce clause questions do not
involve individual or minority rights of the type that might require
judicial protection of the politically powerless. a7 Indeed, even under
the current system, the courts, when they uphold a challenge under
the dormancy doctrine, do not guarantee the prevailing challenger
against nullification of the victory by the national political branches.
As the Supreme Court held in PrudentialInsurance Co. v. Benjamin,3 8 Congress may authorize state laws that would otherwise violate the dormancy doctrine.39
Benjamin explicitly recognizes that, even when a state law is discriminatory, the question of whether it should be allowed to stand is a
policy matter on which the Court will defer to the expressed findings
of Congress. And this is clearly correct as a matter of constitutional
policy. Certainly, the question of whether a state law impermissibly
interferes with interstate commerce should be decided by a decisionmaker with a national source of authority to ensure, to the extent
possible, that the viewpoint of the decision reflects the national interest. Congress and the agencies it has created, no less than the courts
(and perhaps more than some lower courts), have national constituencies. They have the same policy agenda in this area as the courts dobalancing the benefits of the state law against the imposition on interstate commerce. Unlike the courts, however, Congress and the agencies are the proper authorities for deciding policy questions when no
constitutional matter is at stake.
Given the Benjamin doctrine, the issue really is whether the
courts should make a presumptive decision-a decision pending ac37 A law that interferes with interstate commerce in a questionable manner might, of
course, violate some other constitutional provision, such as the privileges and immunities
clause or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. If it does, though, it can be
invalidated on that ground without reaching the commerce clause. Cf Tyler Pipe Indus. v.
Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). For present purposes, therefore, we may assume that any state law
under examination has passed muster with respect to other constitutional provisions.
38 328 U.S. 408, 423-24 (1946).
39 See also Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980) (dictum).
Congress, of course, has power to regulate the flow of interstate commerce in ways
that the States, acting independently, may not. And Congress, if it chooses, may
exercise this power indirectly by conferring upon the States an ability to restrict
the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy.
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tion by the political branches--concerning the validity of state laws.
In other words, should the courts alter the inertia of the political system? 40 Courts, of course, make presumptive decisions of policy, subject to alteration by the legislature, all the time; that is the common
law. But because political inertia often means that the presumptive
decision, at least for a while, will be the final decision, courts must
always consider whether they have good and legally sufficient reason
to alter the status quo on a matter that is within the political realm.
Until late in the nineteenth century the courts probably had good
reason to do so. Monitoring state laws requires a large amount of
decisionmaking with respect to individual cases. A national legislature can set general policy, but it is not fit to perform most of the
spadework. The task requires numerous participants, preferably dispersed throughout the nation. For the first century under the Constitution, there was no substantial federal bureaucracy, and during most
of that time probably no serious thought of creating one: the first
great agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, was created in
1887. The natural tendency, therefore, was to rely on federal judges
to do the work that more properly ought to be performed by political
officers. 4 ' Perhaps this accounts for the doctrine's evolution. And the
doctrine may have continued to thrive because of judicial and political
inertia-judges are frequently reluctant to discard old doctrine, and
legislators are hesitant to revise decisions that appear to have already
been made elsewhere.
Now, however, there need not be a vacuum for the courts to fill.
If the courts were to step out of the arena, Congress could easily delegate the authority to decide, absent action by Congress itself, on the
40 Cf G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163-67 (1982).
41 Note that in 1792, pursuant to the Invalid Pensions Act, Congress assigned circuit

judges administrative functions with respect to pension claims: judges were to determine
whether a potential pensioner was indeed an invalid as a result of service in the military, and if
so, what should be the amount of his pension. These recommendations were then passed on to
the Secretary of War, who could choose to ignore or accept the judges' recommendations.
Marcus & Tier, Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 527,

529. Many of the circuit judges refused to hear any pension cases, however, because they
believed the Act was invalid in providing that decisions of article III judges could be overruled
by the Secretary of the War. Id. at 529-33; see Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792)
(denying Attorney General's ex officio mandamus motion seeking to compel circuit court for
District of Pennsylvania to act on Hayburn's pension petition). This role of the circuit courts
was eliminated entirely by subsequent passage of the 1793 Invalid Pensions Act, Marcus &
Tier, supra, at 539 n.83, and in November 1794, the House, to enable Congress to determine
claims itself, established a Committee of Claims with jurisdiction over all money claims against
the United States, including pension claims, Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the
United States: The Evolutionfrom a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L.
REV. 625, 643-44 (1985).
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continued validity of state laws. In fact, Congress already does this to
some extent, because many agencies are authorized to preempt state
laws within their domain. If the courts were to step out of the dormancy business-or if Congress were to boot them out 42 -Congress
would simply have to fashion a greater delegation of authority, to one
agency or to a combination of them.
Would it be preferable for an agency, rather than the courts, to
make the presumptive decisions? I think the answer is clearly
affirmative.
First, agencies, unlike courts, are subject to political control, and
thus can more properly and comfortably exercise political judgment.
A court is acting somewhat presumptuously if it says that national
policy demands-or does not demand-free travel for sixty-five-foot
double trailers; on the other hand, an agency doing the same thing
would be doing its job. Agencies might, indeed, feel free to be more
aggressive than courts in invalidating state laws. Because courts are
properly hesitant to decide matters of political policy, they tend to be
reticent when a case does not fit neatly into doctrinal terms.
Thus, in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,43 the Supreme
Court refused to strike down a very steep, but formally nondiscriminatory, severance tax on coal, even though it was apparent that the
brunt of the tax would be borne out of state.' Certainly Montana is
allowed to impose some severance tax on coal, but no doctrine could
determine what an appropriate level is; hence, the Court stepped out
of the picture altogether. I doubt that an agency untrammeled by the
need to decide cases with a doctrinal venire would be so deferential.
Courts' need for doctrinal guideposts might also explain the at42

Consider a statute such as this:

No state law shall be deemed invalid as against the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Nothing herein shall prevent any state law from being deemed invalid
against the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution by reason of other parts of the
Constitution or of laws made in pursuance of any part of the Constitution.
Under PrudentialIns. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), such a law might be upheld: it
represents a wholesale judgment by Congress that it prefers the national political processes,
rather than the courts, to determine whether state laws impermissibly interfere with interstate
commerce. Under one theory-sharply attacked by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Tyler Pipe
Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 262 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)--the dormancy doctrine enforces the presumed will of Congress. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1890) (dictum) ("[S]o long as Congress does not
pass any law to regulate [interstate commerce], or allowing the States so to do, it thereby
indicates its will that such commerce shall be free and untrammeled."); see American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 289 n.23 (1987). At least under that theory, a statute of
this kind ought to be upheld, because the statute negates any presumption of congressional
intent to leave the commerce unregulated.
43 453 U.S. 609 (1981).

44 Id. at 618-29.
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traction of the theory, which Justice Scalia has endorsed, 4 that discriminatory purpose is the sole, or principal, test in determining the
validity of a state law under the dormancy doctrine. The determination of whether a state law has a discriminatory purpose, difficult as
that may be, is at least a far more manageable standard than one that
asks the court to weigh burdens and benefits. But in terms of what
best serves national policy, a purpose test aims in the wrong direction.
If the purpose of a state law and the impact of the law on interstate
commerce diverge, it is the impact on commerce that should be determinative. A state law intended to discriminate against interstate commerce but ineffectual in achieving that end will not do much harm,46
while an innocent but obstructive law should not stand. An agency
would be more likely than a court to focus on obstructive effects.
Furthermore, agencies have far better procedures and resources
than courts for determining whether a state law intolerably interferes
with interstate commerce. Agencies can, at least ideally, muster the
expertise they need to understand technical problems. They can seek
out information in efficient ways; they need not rely on experts provided by parties in interest or on formal procedures better designed to
determine whether the blue car or the orange car entered the intersection first than to determine whether a complex state regulation unduly
interferes with the national economy. They can-and do-act prospectively if that seems most satisfactory, setting out regulations and
guidelines as to what types of laws in a particular area will be preempted and what types will not.47 Alternatively, agencies can mimic
45 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 95-96 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("If [Regan, supra note 33] is not correct, he ought to
be.").
46 This stands in contrast to, say, racial or sexual discrimination, in which improper motivation of a law in itself may do harm, by creating feelings of inadequacy or reinforcing stereotypes. No such harm is created by a law that improperly aims at interstate commerce.
47 For example, in 1976 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board feared that some states would
forbid "due on sale" clauses from home mortgages and that such laws would undermine financial institutions' stability, raise interest rates, and impede the market for homes. Accordingly,
the Board promulgated regulations preempting state laws forbidding such clauses. 41 Fed.
Reg. 6283, 6285 (1976); see Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,

159 (1982) (upholding the preemption); see also Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 710 F.2d 878, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Believing that these state restrictions have the effect
of discouraging national banks from offering ARMs [adjustable rate mortgages], the Comptroller [of the Currency] determined that his regulations should override inconsistent state
law." (citing Adjustable Rate Mortgages, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,932 (1981))); City of Boston v. Harris, 619 F.2d 87, 89 (1st Cir. 1980) (upholding HUD regulations that preempted all local rent

control laws as applied to federally subsidized insured projects; HUD regarded such laws as
"'a significant factor in causing owners of FHA projects, especially subsidized projects, to

default on their mortgage payments'" (quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 8189 (1975))); cf Exec. Order
No. 12612, 3 C.F.R. 252, 255 (1987), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 478-79 (1988) ("Federal-
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a court if that seems most appropriate, deciding a particular case in an
adversarial proceeding. Also like a court, they can act immediately to
provide interim relief whenever necessary.
In short, almost anything a court can do in this area an agency
can do, probably better, and the agency can do much more besides.
The reason is simple: an agency may act like a court, but it is not
required to do so. The judiciary has all the disadvantages of a bureaucracy-it is a bureaucracy of sorts-but with none of the flexibility.
Only one potentially significant drawback is apparent: an agency
might be more subject to state-oriented political pressures, especially
from the governor and the Congressional delegation, than a court
would be. This is not so clear, however; lower court judges may be
subject to bias in favor of their home states."8 If localized political
pressure really is a problem, the agency might be immunized to a
large degree by making the agency independent, protecting the tenure
of its heads. But I do not believe this is necessary. The vast majority
of the agency's decisions would not involve questions so crucial to a
state that its political apparatus would gear up to full lobbying power.
In addition, as with most administrative action, judicial review to protect against arbitrariness-but not to balance policy benefits and burdens-would be available.
Moreover, our political system generates many decisions with
differential local impacts-the location of defense plants, the amounts
of farm subsidies and savings and loan bailouts and indeed the allocation of the entire federal budget, and on and on. The decisions in any
particular case are sometimes subject to localized political pressure,
but a fair dispersion of political power guarantees against lopsided
results overall. We would not consider attempting to guarantee fairness on a case-by-case basis by referring any of these matters to the
judiciary; it is mysterious why the question of whether a state law
intolerably interferes with the national economy should be treated
differently.
Perhaps, though, it might appear that I have misstated the choice
as one between an agency and the courts: both can only make presumptive determinations, an agency until Congress decides otherwise
ism", § 4(b)) (instructing executive branch to preempt state law by rule-making "only when

the statute expressly authorizes issuance of preemptive regulations or there is some other firm
and palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the Congress intended to delegate to the
department or agency the authority to issue regulations preempting State law").
48 Moreover, if the system I propose is subject to political pressure, so is the current one,
because the courts' decisions, whether for or against the state law, may be overridden by the
political branches. As discussed below, the courts' decisions under the dormancy doctrine
may affect political inertia-and so the set of political pressures on each side of the issue.
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and the courts until Congress or a properly authorized agency decides
otherwise. Thus, the argument that I have made based on Benjamin 4 9 -that the dormancy doctrine offers no strong protection because the political processes can reverse the courts' decision-may be
turned around: a decision by the courts cannot do irreparable harm
because it is subject to political reversal. But it would be a mistake to
underestimate the importance of political inertia. If the courts invalidate a state law, then the inertia shifts: now the state, rather than
those opposing its laws, must gain political relief. If the courts reject
a challenge to a state law, inertia is also affected, albeit less obviously:
once the courts consider and reject a claim that a state law interferes
impermissibly with commerce, the political branches are less likely to
focus attention on the claim than if the claim had not been in court at
all. We do not allow the courts even to shift political inertia by creating a presumptive budget or schedule of farm price supports. There is
no apparent reason why we should allow them to create a presumptive federal commerce policy.
Perhaps the discussion in this essay seems to reflect an idealized
view of the political processes (as some judicial opinions reflect an
idealized view of judicial process50 ). I do not believe so; the discussion has taken into account the fact that the political processes are far
messier than we would like. These are, however, the processes to
which we commit most of the great questions of our national life.
Those same processes are the best we have to determine, initially as
well as ultimately, whether a state law intolerably intrudes on the national economy.
This suggests two simple questions. If we were to redraft the
commerce clause, would we delegate to the judiciary the initial responsibility of deciding which laws intolerably obstruct interstate
commerce? And if not, is there any reason other than sheer inertia
why we should not start all over again?
49 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
50 Strauss, Comment: Legal Process, and Judges in the Real World, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.

1653 (1991).
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